The primary goal of this paper is to recast the semantics of modal logic, and dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) in particular, in category-theoretic terms. We first review the category of relations and categories of Kripke frames, with particular emphasis on the duality between relations and adjoint homomorphisms. Using these categories, we then reformulate the semantics of DEL in a more categorical and algebraic form. Several virtues of the new formulation will be demonstrated: The DEL idea of updating a model into another is captured naturally by the categorical perspectivewhich emphasizes a family of objects and structural relationships among them, as opposed to a single object and structure on it. Also, the categorical semantics of DEL can be merged straightforwardly with a standard categorical semantics for first-order logic, providing a semantics for first-order DEL.
Introduction
Dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) is a powerful tool at the core of "logical dynamics" [8] , a logical approach to the dynamics of information and interaction. Its semantics is general, flexible, and applicable to a wide range of informational processes in which rational agents update their knowledge and belief. It is also malleable and admits a variety of extra structures-e.g. probabilities, preferences, questions, awareness. It therefore forms a basis for logical studies of various aspects of agency in information and interaction.
The primary goal of this paper is to reformulate the standard semantics of DEL in category-theoretic terms. 1 One central idea of that semantics is that, to interpret DEL, we need to consider not just a single model but a family of models, in which one model is "updated" into another by a certain construction that models a given type of informational process. This is, in fact, a kind of idea that is treated naturally from the perspective of category theory. Category theory emphasizes a family of objects and structural relationships among them, as opposed to a single object and structure on it. Moreover, it can compare structural relationships at a "higher level" among different categories, e.g. between a category and another that is obtained by adding extra structure to the former. All this makes category theory excellent at capturing structural properties of a given family of models and constructions in a conceptually unifying fashion. And this paper will show that the semantics of DEL is an instance of this. Section 2 will lay out Kripke semantics for propositional classical modal logic from a categorical perspective. Many of the concepts and facts covered in Section 2, such as subframes or duality results, are found in standard expositions such as [12, 10] ; yet we will put more emphasis on the categorical structure of Kripke frames and on "higher" duality between relations and algebra operations. In Section 3 we will use the categorical structure of Kripke frames to shed new, categorical light on the standard semantics of DEL. We are not to propose a new semantics in this section, and the facts that will be covered are already known in literature (e.g. the standard exposition [16] ). The point will instead be to use a categorical formulation and thereby to highlight structural properties in the standard semantics of DEL, uncovering the dual, algebraic ideas behind the semantics. Section 4 will give a demonstration of a virtue of our categorical, structural perspective, by showing how to extend DEL to the first order with a new, "sheaf" semantics. 2 Clearly, our knowledge and belief and their update often involve quantified propositions, and therefore can be subject to "first-order DEL". It may nevertheless appear extremely complicated to introduce gadgets for quantification to the DEL framework. The structural approach, however, enables us to treat the DEL structure and the first-order structure as two modules to be simply combined. This will make obvious the conceptual power of the approach. Section 5 will discuss connections between our approach and some of the preceding categorical ones (such as the coalgebraic one). Then Section 6 will conclude the paper, referring to lines of future work.
This article adopts the following convention when displaying facts and results: Already known results are called "Facts", with references attached in footnotes. Results that have not been explicitly stated before (to the best of the author's knowledge) are called "Theorems" or "Corollaries" (the latter follow from already known results immediately). 3 
A Categorical Look at Kripke Semantics
This preliminary section lays out a categorical perspective on Kripke semantics for propositional classical modal logic. We mostly consider a single pair of unary modal operators and , but everything extends to a family of operator pairs (as we will see in the final paragraph of Subsection 2.3).
The Category of Relations
Let us first review basic facts about the category of binary relations. Given sets X and Y , we write R : X → Y to mean that R is a relation "from X to Y ", i.e. R ⊆ X × Y . Relations R 1 : X → Y and R 2 : Y → Z, sharing the same Y , can be composed to form another R 1 ; R 2 : X → Z, by defining wR 1 ; R 2 u iff wR 1 vR 2 u for some v ∈ Y . The composition is also written R 2 • R 1 (note the opposite orders of writing R 1 and R 2 ). The identity relation w = v on X , written 1 X , is the identity of this composition, meaning that 1 X ; R = R = R; 1 Y for every R : X → Y . Then sets and binary relations form a category, Rel. This category comes with some extra structures, of which the most relevant to this article are the following: 4 • Rel is a "dagger category": Each relation R : X → Y has its opposite, R † :
, and extends to a self-dual functor − † : Rel op → Rel by setting X † = X for each set X . 5
• Rel is "locally posetal": For each pair of sets X and Y , the set Rel(X ,Y ) of relations from X to Y is a poset ordered by ⊆. That is, relations R 1 , R 2 : X → Y satisfy the "higher" relation R 1 ⊆ R 2 if 2 A first-order extension of dynamic logic was given in [20] . The first attempt to extend DEL to the first order was [29] , which introduced terms that referred to epistemic agents (and hence had a different format of logic than in this paper). Both of these extensions used constant domains for interpreting quantification. Constant domains can be seen as a (rather rigid) subcase of sheaves (and less flexible than sheaves in general); their axiomatization requires the so-called Barcan formula and other axioms be added to the simple union of modal logic and first-order logic (see Fact 5) . 3 We thank an anonymous reviewer for their suggestion of this convention. 4 Categories with the following structures are studied e.g. in [33] , where they are called "ordered categories with involution". 5 Rel admits an even stronger structure of "dagger compact (closed) category", but this structure does not play an explicit rôle in this article. See Subsection 3.4.2 of [15] for Rel as a dagger compact category. 
• The two structures then interact in such a way that the functor † gives order isomorphisms † :
The locally posetal structure makes Rel a higher category with objects ("0-cells") X , arrows ("1-cells") R between objects, and higher arrows ("2-cells") ⊆ between arrows (1-cells). 6 In addition, Rel satisfies 1. the "law of modularity": Many properties of relations can be expressed with ⊆. E.g., R : X → X is reflexive, i.e. w = v implies wRv, iff 1 X ⊆ R. In particular, a relation R : X → Y is a function iff both
Functions are thus a subcase of relations. Moreover, the composition R 2 • R 1 of relations is just the usual composition of functions when R 1 and R 2 are functions. So the category Sets of sets and functions is a subcategory of Rel. On the other hand, Sets gives rise to Rel as follows. A pair of functions f :
. Then a relation R : X → Y corresponds to a jointly monic pair of functions, viz. the projections r 1 : R → X :: (w, v) → w and r 2 : R → Y :: (w, v) → v from the set R ⊆ X ×Y , so that the pair (r 1 , r 2 ) "tabulates" the relation R : X → Y , meaning that R = r 2 • r 1 † . 7 
Relation-Modality Biduality
Kripke semantics uses binary relations to interpret unary modal operators. A Kripke frame is a set X paired with a binary relation R : X → X , and a Kripke model is a Kripke frame (X , R) equipped with an assignment − of subsets p ⊆ X to propositional variables p. In fact we extend the notation to all propositions ϕ, so that w ∈ ϕ ⊆ X means that ϕ is true at w. Now, given a relation R : X → Y , define two monotone maps ∃ R , ∀ R : PX → PY by
Then, for a relation R : X → X on a set X , ∃ R † , ∀ R † : PX → PX interpret the "possibility" operator and the "necessity" operator , respectively-i.e.
An important property of ∃ − and ∀ − is that every relation R gives an adjunction (or "Galois connec-
(And it also gives ∃ R † ⊣ ∀ R via R † .) Therefore left adjoints ∃ R preserve arbitrary joins and right adjoints ∀ R preserve arbitrary meets. It also needs noting that a relation f : X → Y is a function iff ∃ f † = ∀ f † , in which case ∃ f † = ∀ f † is the inverse-image map 6 See Chapter XII of [36] for this type of higher categories, "bicategories". Rel appears in Subsection 1.5 (i) of [32] as an example of bicategory. A more general account of bicategories of relations is found in [11] . A similar approach, in terms of categories called "allegories", is taken in Chapter 2 of [17] , which also gives a thorough account of ideas in this subsection. 7 The correspondence mentioned here is not quite 1-1. For two jointly monic pairs of functions (r 1 : Z → X, r 2 : Z → Y ) and
• f for i = 1, 2, then the two pairs correspond to the same relation R ⊆ X ×Y . One can of course identify such isomorphic pairs of jointly monic pairs and force the correspondence to be 1-1. f −1 : PY → PX . So, for every function f , the map f −1 = ∃ f † = ∀ f † preserves all joins and meets, and moreover ∃ f ⊣ f −1 ⊣ ∀ f , which is one of the fundamental facts for categorical logic. 8 One of the most fundamental categorical facts to the interpretation (2) is the equivalence of Rel and categories of complete atomic Boolean algebras (CABAs). Let CABA ∨ and CABA ∧ be the categories of CABAs with all-join-preserving maps and with all-meet-preserving maps, respectively, and then Fact 1. ∃ − :: R → ∃ R and ∀ − :: R → ∀ R extend to equivalences of categories ∃ − : Rel → CABA ∨ and ∀ − : Rel → CABA ∧ , both sending a set X to its powerset PX , while every CABA has the form PX . 9 Putting this in "concrete" terms,
• The relations R : X → Y correspond 1-1 to the all-join-preserving maps ∃ R : PX → PY , and also 1-1 to the all-meet-preserving maps ∀ R : PX → PY . In other words, for every pair of sets X and Y , each of ∃ − and ∀ − induces a bijection from Rel(X ,Y ) to the set C(PX , PY ) of arrows of C = CABA ∨ , CABA ∧ from PX to PY .
In fact, higher versions of Fact 1 are relevant to modal logic. Recall that Rel is equipped with higher arrows between arrows, i.e. the relations ⊆ among relations R 1 , R 2 : X → Y . Similarly, C = CABA ∨ , CABA ∧ are also equipped with the relation among arrows h 1 , h 2 : PX → PY , by setting 10 meaning that
Yet there are more versions of this result that are less frequently mentioned but equally important. Since Rel has two levels of arrows, R and ⊆, there are four types of (higher) functors F from Rel to another higher category C, viz., F : Rel → C, with the direction of neither R nor ⊆ flipped; F : Rel op → C, with just R flipped; F : Rel co → C, with just ⊆ flipped; F : Rel coop → C, with both R and ⊆ flipped. 11 Therefore there can be four versions of equivalence (or duality). Corollary 1. ∀ − : Rel co → CABA ∧ is a "2-cell duality", i.e. an equivalence flipping ⊆ (but not R). Concretely put,
Moreover, composing ∃ − and ∀ − with the self-dual functor † : Rel op → Rel, which is a "1-cell duality", i.e. an equivalence flipping R but not ⊆, we obtain
† (note the reversed order), i.e., ∃ − † and ∀ − † induce order-preserving isomorphisms
Thus, (2) means that the modal operators and are duals to the relations R : X → X , in such a "higher" way that the relation ⊆ among the latter corresponds to the relation among the former (e.g. the reflexivity of R, i.e. 1 X ⊆ R, is equivalent by (4) to 1 PX ∃ R † and by (5) to ∀ R † 1 PX , i.e. ϕ ⊢ ϕ and ϕ ⊢ ϕ). 12 This higher duality plays a fundamental rôle in this article as well as in Kripke semantics in general.
One more fact that will prove useful is the "Beck-Chevalley condition":
Categories of Kripke Frames
Let us now consider categories of Kripke frames. A monotone map from a Kripke frame
Observe that this can equivalently be written as either of the following.
The formulation (8) strengthens to f being a bounded morphism, i.e. satisfying both (8) and
Let us write Kr for the category of Kripke frames and monotone maps, and Kr B for its subcategory of bounded morphisms. The duality observed in Subsection 2.2 immediately entails duality results between Kripke frames and "CABAs with operators" (CABAOs), i.e. CABAs equipped with all-join-preserving operators . The isomorphisms ∃ − † : Rel(X , X ) → CABA ∨ (PX , PX ) in Corollary 2 mean that the Kripke frames (X , R) correspond 1-1 to the CABAOs (PX , ). Moreover, while the functions f : X → Y and the CABA homomorphisms h : PY → PX are dual to each other, Corollary 2 further implies (by
i.e., f −1 being a CABAO homomorphism, i.e. a CABA homomorphism that moreover preserves (and
. Therefore the category Kr B is dual to the category CABAO of CABAOs and CABAO homomorphisms. 14 In fact, let us call a CABA homomorphism h "continuous" if it has • h h • , and then Corollary 2 implies that (7)- (8) are equivalent to 12.
e. the continuity of f −1 . Hence the category Kr is dual to the category CABAO C of CABAOs and continuous CABA homomorphisms [19] . We should stress, however, that these duality results are merely derivative, and that the dualities in Subsection 2.2 are more fundamental. It is the latter duality that we will take essential advantage of throughout this article.
We have so far considered a single pair of operators and , but in epistemic logic we often take a set A of agents and consider a pair of operators [α] (also written K α , for "α knows that") and α for each agent α ∈ A. To interpret this A-indexed set of operator pairs, a Kripke frame X needs to be equipped with an A-indexed set of relations R α : X → X as well. Let us say that a function f :
α∈A is monotone if it preserves every R α X by satisfying (7)- (8) (with R α X in place of R X ), and a bounded morphism if it satisfies (7)- (10) for every R α X (in place of R X ). Then the Kripke frames with A-many relations and their monotone maps or bounded morphisms form categories Kr A and Kr BA , subsuming Kr and Kr B above as just a special case with A a singleton. The duality results in this section carry over straightforwardly to Kr A and Kr BA , with respect to CABAs with A-many operators.
Topological Constructions for Kripke Frames
Having introduced two categories of Kripke frames, it may appear to be a natural question which of the two we should adopt as "the" category of Kripke frames. The answer is, however, that we need both Kr and Kr B . The significance of Kr B is fairly obvious and well studied. Bounded morphisms are dual to homomorphisms preserving and as well as all the other connectives, and therefore closely connected to the preservation of modal logic. Indeed, the bisimulations are precisely the "relations in Kr B " (see the final paragraph of Subsection 3.1). By the same token, in the coalgebraic approach to Kripke semantics, the kind of homomorphisms considered are those corresponding to bounded morphisms, and hence the considered category of coalgebras is equivalent to Kr B (see Section 5 for more on the connection to the coalgebraic approach). Quite arguably, Kr B plays a more prominent rôle than Kr does, as long as the "static" modal logic is concerned. Nevertheless, this statement no longer applies to the semantics of dynamic epistemic logic (DEL). Many of the semantic constructions crucial for DEL take place in Kr but not in Kr B . Indeed, to let DEL show interesting behaviors, it is essential to use monotone maps and not bounded morphisms.
The category Kr admits a wide range of constructions that are directly connected to ones in Sets using sets and functions. They are due to Fact 3. Kr is "topological over Sets", 15 meaning, concretely, the following. Given any family of func-
is the (unique) "initial lift" of { f i } i∈I , i.e. the relation on X such that, given any function g :
(In fact, Fact 3 holds of Kr A in general, again with R α X in place of R X .) One may note that the relation R X in Fact 3 is the largest relation on X preserved by all f i , since, for every relation R on X ,
It is easy to observe that initial lifts preserve many properties of relations such as reflexivity, transitivity, and symmetry. Then the full subcategories of Kr given by those properties and combinations thereof, such as Preord of the preorders (i.e. reflexive and transitive relations) and Equiv of the equivalence relations, are said to be "initially closed". It follows that these subcategories are also topological over Sets, and that the inclusion functors have left-adjoints. 16 E.g., the left adjoint F : Kr → Preord sends a Kripke frame (X , R) to (X , R * ), where R * is the reflexive and transitive closure of R. One consequence of Kr, or a subcategory such as Preord, being topological over Sets is that it also has "final lifts", dual to initial lifts of Fact 3. E.g., given a family of preorders (X , R α ) (α ∈ A) on the same set X , such as "epistemic" relations R α of agents α ∈ A, consider an A-indexed family of identity maps {1 X } α∈A in Sets; then its final lift in Preord comes with the epistemic relation for the "common knowledge" of the group A, i.e. ( α R α ) * . 17 Another consequence, more relevant to this article, is that the forgetful functor U : Kr → Sets to the complete and cocomplete category Sets lifts limits and colimits-meaning that, given any (small) diagram D in Kr, its (co)limit exists on the (co)limit of U • D in Sets. Most notably,
Given a family of Kripke frames (Y
These constructions, and their canonical maps p i and i, are crucial to the semantics of DEL, as we will see in Section 3. Pullbacks in Kr will also play a key rôle later in Subsection 4.3. In particular, observe Theorem 1. The pullback of a bounded morphism in Kr is a bounded morphism. 18 Proof. Let (6) be a pullback in Kr, let R X be the relation on X , similarly for Y , Z, and Y × X Z, and let g be a bounded morphism. Then p satisfies (9) as follows, by (7) for f ; the commuting of (6); (10) for g; Corollary 3; the law of modularity (1); and the definition of R Y × X Z as the initial lift of p and q.
It needs stressing, however, that the canonical maps of "topological" constructions in this subsection are not in general bounded morphisms, and hence do not live in Kr B . Indeed, as we will see, they must not be bounded morphisms for DEL to show interesting behaviors.
A Categorical Look at Dynamic Epistemic Logic
This section shows how to use the categorical structure of Section 2 to reformulate the standard semantics of dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) structurally. We will first review the simpler subcase of public announcement logic (PAL) in Subsection 3.1, and then expand it to the general DEL in Subsection 3.2.
Public Announcement Logic
Regular monos i of Kr in (15) are used to interpret PAL. This logic has unary operators [σ !] and σ ! for all of its propositions σ . The proposition [σ !]ϕ is intended to mean "ϕ will be the case after σ is publicly and truthfully announced (or observed)", and interpreted as follows: Given a Kripke model (X , R X , − X ) and a subset S = σ X with inclusion i : S ֒→ X , let (S, R S , − S ) be the submodel on S-which is defined by
Similarly (or De Morgan-dually), 17 . w ∈ σ ! ϕ X iff both w ∈ σ X and w ∈ ϕ S , i.e., iff v ∈ ϕ S for some v ∈ S such that viw.
One may contrast (16) and (17) to
So, although generally ϕ S = i −1 ϕ X , for atomic p we have p S = i −1 p X by definition, and hence have a "reduction axiom"
Reduction axioms, taken together for atomic sentences and for all the "static" connectives, completely axiomatize PAL by reducing it to the static modal logic. Proofs for reduction axioms for connectives are:
19. Because ∀ i preserves meets,
These algebraic proofs are straightforward applications of properties of the duality ∀ − † . In particular, it should be noted that (21), the reduction via , is simply a dual to the equality of relations
A perspective on (16)- (17) that has been guiding the study of the semantics of PAL, and indeed of DEL (see e.g. [6] ), is that [σ !] and σ ! are interpreted by ∀ i and ∃ i , and therefore are the modal operators of the relation i † (called a "transition relation" in [6] ), similarly to and interpreted by ∀ R † and ∃ R † of R as in (2) . One difference is that, whereas R is a relation on the same set, i † is between different sets. Thus PAL, and DEL in general, generalize Kripke semantics by using relations R : X → Y between different Kripke frames to interprete modal operators. In studying this general setting, it proves helpful to use the relation-modality dualities of Subsection 2.2 (and not just the derivative dualities of Subsection 2.3 between Kripke frames and CABAOs). It may also be interesting to note that σ ⇒ − and σ ∧ − in (18) , which play an essential rôle in reduction axioms, are modal operators, too, viz. those of the relation i • i † : X → X . This is the reason the relation-modality duality ∀ − † is applicable in (21) .
A point of caution here for our categorical approach is that, in general, R : X → Y is neither a structure on a Kripke frame (an object of the category Kr) nor a monotone map (an arrow of Kr). So, to accommodate it in terms of Kr, we use the idea of tabulation from Subsection 2.1: A relation R : X → Y corresponds to the pair of projections r 1 : R → X and r 2 : R → Y from the set R ⊆ X ×Y , so that R = r 2 
Dynamic Epistemic Logic
Let us now consider the Baltag-Moss-Solecki semantics of DEL [7] and observe how product update in it can be treated categorically. Take two Kripke frames, (X , R X ) and (E, R E ), and regard the former as an "epistemic model" and the latter as an "event model". So, let us assume that (X , R X ) is equipped with an interpretation Pre(e) X ⊆ X of the precondition Pre(e) of every event e ∈ E (or we can take a Kripke model (X , R X , − X ) on (X , R X )); we write i e : Pre(e) X ֒→ X for the inclusion maps. Then the product model of the two frames, obtained by "updating" (X , R X ) with (E, R E ), is defined on the disjoint union of i e , i.e. the subset
The "epistemic" relation R X⊗E on X ⊗ E is defined as the subframe of the product (X × E, R X×E ) of (X , R X ) and (E, R E ), using (14) and (15) . This amounts to (w 1 , e 1 )R X⊗E (w 2 , e 2 ) ⇐⇒ w 1 R X w 2 and e 1 R E e 2 , i.e.,
for the projections p X : X ⊗ E → X :: (w, e) → w and p E : X ⊗ E → E :: (w, e) → e. In short, it is the initial lift of p X and p E . In addition, given a Kripke model − X on X , it induces an updated Kripke model on 19 Let us analyze this construction a bit further, using the following diagram (for each e ∈ E).
Here ϕ is supposed to mean "ϕ will be the case after the event e takes place". The interpretation, similar to (16)- (17), is as follows:
As in (18) ,
which we may call "static precondition modalities", as the modal operators of i e • i e † . Then the reduction axioms of DEL can be proven as follows. (The reduction via ∧ goes since ∀ R e † preserves meets, just the same way as in (19) ; the case of ¬ is similar to (20) , albeit more complicated.)
p X • R e = i e • i e
† implies the following for atomic p, by (25) and 
Observe on the other hand that, for a family of relations R i : X → Y of the same type, we have
We conclude this section with a remark on the significance of using the category Kr. We reviewed in this section that topological constructions (Subsection 2.4) and their canonical maps play essential rôles in the semantics of PAL and DEL. These constructions take place in Kr as opposed to the category Kr B , and the canonical maps are monotone maps of Kr, and not bounded morphisms of Kr B . Indeed, for DEL to show interesting behaviors, the canonical maps-in particular, p X : X ⊗E → X , which amounts to i : σ X ֒→ X in the case of PAL-must not be bounded moprphisms. For, if p X is a bounded morphism, then ϕ X⊗E = p X −1 ϕ X for every ϕ and not just atomic p (this entails [E, e]ϕ ≡ Pre(e) ⇒ ϕ the same way as in (26))-this means that no event can teach agents anything. In other words, for events to teach agents something, they must bring about some change logically, and therefore the maps f representing them must not have logic-preserving duals f −1 .
Application: Quantification
This section demonstrates a virtue of our categorical perspective, by showing how to extend DEL to the first order. Our structural approach to DEL and the standard structural approach to first-order logic can be integrated together, simply as two modules, using the methodology of category theory. We will first review how to interpet classical first-order logic in Subsection 4.1, and how to add this first-order structure to Kripke semantics using "Kripke sheaves" in Subsection 4.2. We will then equip this semantics with a DEL-type update in Subsection 4.3, obtaining a new sheaf semantics for first-order DEL.
Classical Semantics in a Slice Category
Here we review how the standard semantics for classical first-order logic goes in the category Sets/X , as the non-modal basis of semantics in Subsection 4.2. See [39] for a more general and extensive account.
Let us first recall the definition of slice category. Given any category C, fix any object C. Then the slice category C/C, "C over C", consists of the following:
• Objects are any arrow f : D → C of C with the codomain C.
• Arrows from f :
In particular, given a set X , Sets/X is the category of "sets and functions over X ":
• Objects, "sets over X ", are functions π : D → X . For each w ∈ X we write D w for the inverse image π −1 ({w}), called the "fiber over w".
• And arrows from π 1 : D → X to π 2 : E → X are functions f : D → E "over X ", meaning that π 2 • f = π 1 , or equivalently that if a ∈ D w then f (a) ∈ E w for the same w.
We will also later consider a Kripke-structured version of Sets/X , viz. Kr/(X , R) over a Kripke frame (X , R): Its objects and arrows are monotone maps and not just any functions. Fixing any (nonempty) set X , the slice category Sets/X is used to interpret classical first-order logic as follows. We fix an object π : D → X of Sets/X , and a surjection π in particular. We then regard X as a set of worlds and D as a set of individuals. Each individual a ∈ D is assumed to live in a unique world, viz. π(a) ∈ X . In this sense we may call π a "residence map". For each world w ∈ X , the fiber D w = π({w}) is the set of individuals living in w. In fact, for each n ∈ N, the cartesian product D n w = D w × · · · × D w is the set of n-tuples of individuals living in w, and the disjoint union of D n w for all w ∈ X , i.e. the n-fold "fibered product" of D over X , One important note regarding the semantics in Sets/X is that it interprets "formulas in contexts". A context is a (finite) sequence of variables that are all distinct. A formula ϕ can be in a context (x 1 , . . . , x n ) if no other variables occur freely in ϕ. It is not assumed that all of x 1 , . . . , x n actually occur freely in ϕ; so, e.g., if ϕ can be in a context (x 1 , . . . , x n ) then it can also be in (x 1 , . . . , x n , x n+1 , . . . x m ) . A formulain-context is a pair of formula and a context it can be in; so, writing ( x 1 , . . . , x n | ϕ ) presupposes that ϕ can be in (x 1 , . . . , x n ) . Now, we semantically interpret formulas-in-contexts ( x 1 , . . . , x n | ϕ ) rather than formulas ϕ: We regard ( x 1 , . . . , x n | ϕ ) as an n-ary predicate that may or may not be true of n-tuples of individuals (a 1 , . . . , a n ). Similarly, we interpret terms-in-contexts ( x 1 , . . . , x n | t ) as mappings of n-tuples of individuals to individuals. We will writex andā for sequences (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and (a 1 , . . . , a n ) .
In propositional logic, we interpret a sentence σ with σ ⊆ X , so that w ∈ σ means that σ is true at w. Similarly, in the semantics in Sets/X , we interpret a closed sentence σ in the empty context with σ ⊆ X . Yet, extending this, we interpret an n-ary formula-in-context (x | ϕ ) with x | ϕ ⊆ D n X , so thatā ∈ x | ϕ means that ϕ is true of individuals a 1 , . . . , a n in place of x 1 , . . . , x n (at the world π(a i )). The same formula ϕ in different contexts is true of different tuples:
). An interpretation − can be defined inductively, first for terms and then for formulas. In interpreting terms in Sets/X , the core idea is to interpret an n-ary term-in-context (x | t ) with an arrow ( x 1 , . . . , x n | t ) and terms t 1 , . . . ,t n , we write t[t 1 , . . . ,t n /x 1 , . . . , x n ] for the result of substituting t i for all the free occurrences of x i in t. Then, given x | t and ȳ | t i for each i n whereȳ = (y 1 , . . . , y m ), write
and we have
Now, to each n-ary relation symbol F, assign any subset F ⊆ D n X , and
for Boolean operators. For quantifiers, take a projection p :
the case of n = 0 is just p = π : D → X . Closely connected to quantification is the substitution of terms: Write ϕ[t/x] for the result of substituting t i for x i in ϕ (this makes sense only if t is free for x in ϕ). Then the substitution satisfies
As an instance of this, given x | ϕ we can add a vacuous variable to the context by
for the same p :: (ā, b) →ā as above; and other operations on contexts (e.g. permutation) can be interpreted in similarly obvious ways.
Kripke-Sheaf Semantics
In this subsection we review "Kripke-sheaf semantics" for first-order modal logic. An extensive exposition of this semantics is in [18] . We use the notation and terminology from [26] , however, to be consistent with Subsection 4.1. 20 As to syntax, we take a first-order language-with relation symbols, variables, function symbols and constants-and add and to it as unary operators that behave just the same way ¬ does. By this we mean in particular that (ϕ[t/x]) (i.e. first substituting t and then applying ) and ( ϕ)[t/x] (first applying and then substituting t) are the same formula, just the same way ¬(ϕ[t/x]) and (¬ϕ)[t/x] are. Now, enter Definition 2 requires π to be not just a monotone map but moreover a Kripke sheaf, whereas no Kripke sheaves are mentioned in the ideas (35)- (38) . The requirement is needed, however, precisely in order for the interaction (38) to behave coherently. Given any σ ⊆ D, observe that there are two ways to obtain y | σ by applying (32) and (34), viz.
So the well-definedness of − , along with (32) and (34), requires that
. that π be a bounded morphism. Indeed, any map ȳ |t involved in (31) must be a bounded morphism. Recall that our syntax has (ϕ[t/x]) = ( ϕ)[t/x]. This means that, for − to be well-defined, we need ȳ (31) and (34) imply
Thus, the well-definedness of − , along with (31) and (34), again requires that t be a bounded morphism. 21 Yet, all maps involved in Definition 2 are indeed guaranteed to be bounded morphisms, by
is also a Kripke sheaf (and hence a bounded morphism). On the other hand, π is a Kripke sheaf iff both π and the "diagonal map" ∆ : D → D 2 X :: a → (a, a) are bounded morphisms. 22 In short, the simple combination of (28)- (32), for classical first-order logic, and (29) and (34), for propositional modal logic, is made possible by Kripke sheaves and Fact 4. And this simple combination makes the logic of Kripke-sheaf semantics the simple union of classical first-order logic and modal logic.
Fact 5. Let FOK be the first-order modal logic that consists of all the rules and axioms of classical firstorder logic, and the rules and axioms of propositional modal logic K. Then FOK is sound and complete with respect to the Kripke-sheaf models. The same holds with S4 (or S5, respectively) in place of K, with respect to the subclass of Kripke-sheaf models over preorders (or equivalence relations). 23 
First-Order Dynamic Epistemic Logic
In Subsection 4.2 we saw how the Kripke-sheaf structure extended the modal logic of a Kripke model to the first order. We will now lay out how the same structure can extend the product update of Kripke models to the first order. 24 One remark is in order: We saw in Sections 2 and 3 that, whereas bounded morphisms play a more prominent rôle than merely monotone maps in the semantics of static modal logic, merely monotone maps are essential in the semantics of DEL. This theme recurs in this subsection. 21 From a perspective of categorical logic, one often takes (31) , for all ϕ, as part of the definition of a model, rather than a derived fact about the model. It is from this perspective that we describe the situation as a matter of well-definedness of the model. One could also see the same situation as a matter of deriving (31) from its atomic case using a property of bounded morphisms; we acknowledge an anonymous reviewer for this perspective. One could of course choose to reject (31) or (34) , or even to use a syntax without (ϕ[t/x]) = ( ϕ)[t/x]. (These options, needless to say, would make Fact 5 unavailable to one's semantics.) A notable case of rejecting (34) is the counterpart theory in [34] , which restricts (34) to the case where all the variables inx actually occur freely in ϕ.
22 See Facts 4.2, 4.4, and 4.6 in [26] . 23 See, e.g., Corollary 6.1.24 of [18] . 24 A sheaf semantics for first-order PAL was given (in a more general, neighborhood setting) in [27] . A first-order extension of PAL was also given briefly in [35] , which, however, used constant domains to interpret quantification. See footnote 2 as well.
In Subsection 4.2, we reviewed the fact that static first-order modal logic needed Kripke sheaves to make sure all the maps involved were bounded morphisms. In our new semantics for first-order DEL, however, the structure of the category Kr of monotone maps will play a central rôle again.
Let (π : (D, R D ) → (X , R X ), − π ) be a Kripke-sheaf model, and (E, R E ) be a Kripke frame. We regard the latter as an event model, and assume that preconditions Pre(e) for e ∈ E are all (closed) sentences, so that Pre(e) π makes sense and Pre(e) π ⊆ X . Then (X , R X ) is product-updated with (E, R E ) into (X ⊗ E, R X⊗E ). For the first-order structure, we moreover "pullback-update" (π, − π ), by pulling everything back along the projection p X : X ⊗ E → X . Recall that (π, − π ) uses the structure of the slice category Kr/(X , R X ); hence p X induces a pullback functor p X * : Kr/(X , R X ) → Kr/(X ⊗ E, R X⊗E ). So we apply this to obtain an updated residence map π X⊗E = p X * π : D X⊗E → X ⊗ E, and to obtain − π X⊗E from f π X⊗E = p X * f π for function symbols f and F π X⊗E = p X * F π for relation symbols F. We need to note that the structure of Kr is essential for the pullback update. Pullbacks are taken in the category Kr of monotone maps in general as opposed to bounded morphisms, and along the map p X : X ⊗ E → X , which, as seen in Subsection 3.2, must not be a bounded morphism for DEL to show interesting behaviors.
Here is an explicit description of the pullback update:
• Using the notation D w = π −1 ({w}), the pullback of π n :
for which we write D n X⊗E , and projections π 
. . , a n R D b n and e 1 R E e 2 .
• For an n-ary function symbol f , we have f π : D n X → D and then
• For an n-ary relation symbol F, we have F π ⊆ D n X and then
The pullback update indeed updates a Kripke-sheaf model to another:
Proof. As in Fact 4, both π and the diagonal map ∆ of π are bounded morphisms, and hence Theorem 1 implies that both π X⊗E = p X * π and p X * ∆ are bounded morphisms. Yet p X * ∆ is the diagonal map of π X⊗E , since the pullback functor p X * preserves finite limits. Therefore π X⊗E is a Kripke sheaf by Fact 4. Moreover, for each n ∈ N, p X * π n is the n-fold product of π X⊗E over X ⊗ E, since p X * preserves finite limits. 
and note the similarity to (22) . We moreover have canonical maps as with (22) 
These then interpret [E, e] and E, e applied to n-ary formulas-in-contexts (x | ϕ ), i.e.,
which is just an "in context" version of (24) . This defines our sheaf semantics for first-order DEL-but we need to check its well-definedness, similarly to the remark following Definition 2. That is, we need
and similarly for E, e . Yet these are the case because t π X⊗E • R m e = R n e • t π by Theorem 3. For any arrow f :
Proof. This follows from Corollary 3 since the following squares are both pullbacks in Sets. 30 There have in fact been algebraic [31] and coalgebraic [5, 14] approaches to DEL. In particular, the algebraic approach by Kurz and Palmigiano [31] uses ideas closely related to those in Section 3 of this article: They observe that the product update X ⊗ E is a subframe of the coproduct X × E = ∑ e∈E X , and study the dual structure, i.e. a quotient of the product ∏ e∈E P(X ). 31 Kurz and Palmigiano are well aware that these constructions do not take place in Kr B or CABAO but rather in Kr and CABAO C . They stop short, however, of studying Kr or CABAO C , saying that "for these dual characterizations to be defined, an a priori specification of the fully fledged category-theoretic environment in which these constructions are taken is actually not needed" ( [31] , 2). We, in contrast, work under the philosophy that, when one finds a good heuritstics that leads to a new result, they should study the heuritstics itself and shape it into a theory that yields more results systematically. The point of Section 4 was to demonstrate how to put to use more structures in Kr. It should also be stressed that we use one more category, viz. Rel, and take essential advantage of the fundamental relation-modality dualities of Subsection 2.2, and not just the derivative dualities of Subsection 2.3 between Kripke frames and CABAOs.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we have recast the standard semantics of dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) in categorical terms and shed new structural light on it. It should be clear by now how conceptually powerful the new way of applying categorical method is: As demonstrated by our new semantics for first-order DEL, our categorical, structural perspective tightly connects what we want (or need) logically or syntactically and what we need (or want) semantically.
Our new application of the categorical methodology promises to be helpful on multiple fronts of the study of DEL. Naturally expected future work is to extend our approach to more vocabulary (e.g. common knowledge or µ-calculus), more types of logic (e.g. higher-order DEL or typed DEL), more structures (e.g. probability), and more general settings (e.g. intuitionistic or constructive modal logic). Various updates can be expressed as functors between categories of models, and these expressions are expected to help characterize properties of updates such as the preservation of constructions or the admitting of reduction axioms. As mentioned in Section 5, the case of S4 can be formulated in terms of toposes. Or our structural, topological ideas on the category Kr of monotone maps for DEL can be used 30 One can of course express Kr with coalgebras, by defining a weaker notion of homomorphism, corresponding to monotone maps-i. Or it may be better to use the characterization in Fact 4-i.e., π is a Kripke sheaf iff both π and ∆ are homomorphisms. See Fact 4.2 of [26] . The latter definition can indeed be extended to more kinds of coalgebras and not just Kripke frames. 31 It is therefore the maps i and q ′ e in (23) that play a central rôle in [31] . In contrast, we put more emphasis on q e and i e , though R e = q e • i e † = i † • q ′ e as noted on p. 362. Also, in our treatment, the characterization of X × E as a product plays a key role as well, since the Kripke frame on X × E is the product of X and E, but not the coproduct of (X) e∈E , in Kr. Moreover, we treat Pre(e) ⇒ − and Pre(e) ∧ − as the modal operators of i e • i e † , a perspective that then enables us to prove the reduction axioms (21) and (27) directly by the relation-modality duality ∀ − † . This should be contrasted to the treatment of Pre(e) ⇒ − and Pre(e) ∧ − in proofs in Section 7 of [31] .
to augment the coalgebraic generalization of the subcategory Kr B of bounded morphisms. One may also find, e.g., (39) too strong for their purpose, and hence need to replace the pullback update with a more flexible idea. Furthermore, although we formulated a categorical semantics, we did not mention a crucial aspect of categorical logic-viz. an interpretation − as a homomorphism. To cover this aspect we need to define a "syntactic category" for DEL; this will then lead to a new theory of duality.
